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ARGUMENT 
I. 
COCA COLA SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM A RELEASE TO WHICH IT WAS NOT 
A PARTY AND WHICH WAS NOT INTENDED TO BENEFIT COCA COLA 
In Krauss v. Utah DOT, 852 P.2d 1014 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals 
interpreted a release with the exact same language that Coca-Cola is now relying on to argue that 
it was released by the release signed in favor of Thomas Stengel. In Krauss, the plaintiff signed a 
document releasing his parents, the drive, their insurance companies and "any and all other firms, 
persons, or corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not, of any and all" causes of 
action. That is the same exact language as appears in the release in this case. As Coca-Cola 
states in its Brief: 
That language specifically states that it releases Thomas & Susan Stengel, 
Nationawide Mutual Co. and "any and all other persons, firms and corporations, 
whether herein named or referred to or not." The release contains a reservation of 
rights, somewhat similar to the reservation in Nelson, but that reservation does not 
concern vicarious liability, or reservation of a claim against Mr. Stengel's 
employer based upon respondeat superior. Rather, the reservation concerns Mr. 
Peterson's contractual right to receive further compensation for Mr. Stengel's 
negligence through underinsured motorist coverage from his own insurer 
American States. Therefore, the release and exoneration of Mr. Stengel releases 
Swire and prevents imputing Stengel's alleged negligent conduct derivatively to 
Swire, (emphasis added) (Brief of Respondent, pp.20-21.) 
In Krauss, the Court of Appeals lays out the principles of how releases are interpreted. 
"We adhere instead to the straight forward concept that releases are contractual provisions and 
should be interpreted according to well developed rules of contract interpretation." Krauss at 
1018. The parties in Krauss argued that one of three different rules of interpretation regarding 
releases should be used: the specific identity rule, four corners rule, or intent rule. The Utah 
Court of Appeals did not adopt the specific identity rule, because it stated that if the Utah 
1 
Legislature intended that rule to be used, it could have said so. Krauss at 1019. Instead, the Utah 
Court of Appeals used the four corners rule and intent rule as basic rules of contract 
interpretation. "Insofar as the parties to this appeal purport that two distinct rules exist, they 
ignore the fact that both rules are attempts to discover the intent of the parties to a release. 
Accordingly, we need not choose between the two rules, but rather apply each, in turn, in the 
course of routine contract interpretation. If the release is unambiguous, it is construed as a matter 
of law within its four corners; if it is not ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is appropriately 
considered to glean the intent of the parties to the release." Krauss at 1020. The Court of 
Appeals found the release in Krauss to be ambiguous because UDOT is a governmental entity, 
and not necessarily covered under the phrase, "all other persons, firms and corporations." 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals looked to extrinsic evidence to glean the intent of the parties. 
"Our task, however, is not to determine whether Krauss proceeded by the safest course, but is 
instead to determine whether the parties to the release contract, in employing the words used, 
intended UDOT to be released." ML at 1021. 
A. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS ALSO ALLOWED WHEN THERE IS AN 
UNREVEALED AND UNDISCOLSED PRINCIPAL. 
As Plaintiff admits, the Coca-Cola Defendants are corporations, so the reason why the 
Court of Appeals found the release ambiguous in Krauss does not apply to this case. However, 
the evidence demonstrates that Stengel was acting within the scope and course of his 
employment when he injured Plaintiff. When he obtained a release that his employer now claims 
released it from liability, Stengel was acting within the scope of his employment. Since Plaintiff 
did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the bargain was completed, the release 
cannot preclude liability on the part of the principal. In the Brief of Respondent, Coca-Cola 
2 
attempts to distinguish the case Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992). Petitioner 
Peterson cited the case as standing for the proposition that an undisclosed principal is liable for 
the acts of his agent, even though the principal is undisclosed. However, as the Court of Appeals 
clearly stated in Krauss, a release is analyzed pursuant to general contract principles. Krauss at 
1019. Therefore, the same contract principles that apply to contracts to release also apply to 
contracts to purchase property. 
In Garland the Supreme Court observed: 
It is well established in the law that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent 
within the scope of the agent's authority, irrespective of whether the principal is 
disclosed or undisclosed. The fact that an agent acts in his own name without 
disclosing his principal does not preclude liability on the part of the principal 
when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt with the agent. 3 
Am. Jur. 2d Agency 320 (1986). This is true even though the third person 
dealing with the agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after 
the bargain was completed. Holman-O.D. Baker Co. v. Pre-Design, Inc., 104 
N.H. 116, 118, 179 A2.d 454, 455 (1962). The Restatement (Second) of Agency 
186 (cmt.c) (1957) states that for the purpose of proving that the agent was acting 
within his authority, parol evidence is admissible, even though the contract is in 
writing, (emphasis added). 
Therefore, this Court must also look to the intent of the parties to determine whether Coca-Cola 
is released by this release. In Krauss, the Court of Appeals held that "when a party not 
specifically named in a release attempts to avail itself of the release, that party bears the burden 
of proving it is an intended beneficiary of the release." Krauss at 1023. Coca-Cola cannot point 
to any evidence in this case that it was an intended beneficiary of the release. The only evidence 
in the case regarding whether Coca-Cola was intended to be a beneficiary of the release is 
contained in the release itself and in the Affidavit of David Goodwill. The release does not 
mention any of the Coca-Cola defendants. The Affidavit of David Goodwill states: 
3 
In the fall of 1994, when finalizing settlement negotiations with American States, 
the underinsured carrier of Stephen Peterson, counsel for Peterson, David 
Goodwill spoke with Thomas Stengel. He learned for the first time that on the 
day of the accident, Stengel was employed by Coca Cola and when he hit the 
Peterson vehicle head-on he was going from one of Coca Cola's customer's stores 
to another store in the course and scope of his employment. 
(Exhibit 5 to Petitioner's Brief.) 
Because Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel did not know that Coca-Cola was the employer of 
Stengel at the time the release was signed, Coca-Cola could not have been intended to be a 
beneficiary of the release. Therefore, under Krauss, Coca-Cola fails in its burden to prove that it 
was an intended beneficiary of the release. 
II. 
THE COCA-COLA DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A SET OFF OF $350,000. 
Contrary to Respondent Coca-Cola's assertion that Petitioner Peterson is raising his 
arguments against the set off issue for the first time on appeal, counsel for Peterson addressed 
this issue at oral argument before Judge Dever on August 8, 2000. In its Brief on page 41, Coca-
Cola cites to pages 20 through 40 of the transcript as evidence that this argument was not raised 
before the trial court. However, the argument made by counsel for Peterson regarding this issue 
of the set off is located on pages 2 through 8 of the transcript. (See transcript attached as Reply 
Addendum Exhibit 1.) 
In the Brief of the Petitioner, counsel set out the arguments why Coca-Cola is not entitled 
to a set off of $350,000, and hereby incorporates those arguments in this Reply Brief. Counsel 
will not repeat those arguments, but only address those issues brought up by Coca-Cola in its 
Brief. Counsel for Petitioner does agree with footnote 16 to Brief of Respondent which states 
that the parties do not dispute that Coca-Cola is entitled to at least a set off of $50,000 for the 
4 
amount received from Stengel's insurer Nationwide. However, Coca-Cola tries to argue that the 
term "entitled to recover damages from owners or operators" in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
305(9)(a) and (b) somehow does not apply to mean a vicariously liable employer, such as Coca-
Cola. The Coca-Cola defendants are corporations, and the only way that a corporation can act is 
through its agents. Mr. Stengel was an employee, and thus an agent, of Coca-Cola at the time of 
the accident, and was operating his vehicle for Coca-Cola when he caused the accident that 
injured Mr. Peterson. Coca-Cola states in its Brief that the "statue does not address the vicarious 
liability of an employer of an underinsured operator or owner..." (Brief of Respondent, p. 43.) 
However, from a basic understanding of how a corporation acts through its agents, it is clear that 
the statute does apply to vicariously liable employers, such as Coca-Cola. Mr. Stengel was 
operating the vehicle for Coca-Cola. 
Next, Coca-Cola argues that because both American States and Coca-Cola are "both 
derivatively liable for the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, Mr. Stengel, American States based 
upon contract and Swire based upon common law tort, both would have claims against Mr. 
Stengel for amounts paid because of his negligence." (Brief of Respondent, p.45). Then 
Respondent argues that because "they stand on equal footing to the other and this equality does 
not create a situation which demands application of the subrogation doctrine." (Brief of 
Respondent, p.45). To the contrary, Coca-Cola may be able to pursue a claim against Mr. 
Stengel, but American States is bound by the release signed by Mr. Peterson. "Insurer seeking 
subrogation has only those rights maintained by its insured; insurer steps into its insured shoes." 
Nimmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 1154 (Mont. 1995). 
5 
Therefore, American States and Coca-Cola are not on equal footing. American States 
must pursue its subrogation interest against Coca-Cola only, and since Stengel was operating the 
vehicle in the course and scope of his employment, and therefore operating it for Coca-Cola, 
under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(a) and (b), Coca-Cola is an operator. 
American States paid Stephen Peterson amounts under its UIM coverage which were 
legitimately owed by Coca-Cola. By legal or equitable principles (and by essential fairness) 
American States is entitled to recover the amounts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Petitioner and set forth above, Plaintiff Stephan 
Peterson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the interlocutory Order dated August 28, 
2000 that granted Defendant' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and remand the case for 
trial allowing Plaintiff to try his case against the Defendants under a theory of vicarious liability/ 
respondeat superior. 
DATED this / "flay of August, 2001. I 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
,«•**" a. 4 
T M DALTON DUNN 
PAUL J. SMONSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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- 2 -
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 8, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: Okay, what's that case number? 
4 COURT CLERK: It's 960901005, 
5 THE COURT: Why don't you enter your appearances while 
6 we're waiting. 
7 MR. LAMBERT: Dale Lambert for the defendants, Swire 
8 Pacific, dba Coca-Cola Bottling. 
9 UNIDENTIFIED: And Rebecca (inaudible) for Coca-Cola. 
10 MR. DUNN: Tim Dunn and David Goodwill on behalf of 
11 the plaintiff, Stephen Peterson. 
12 THE COURT: This is case No. 960901005. This is the 
13 defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. You may 
14 proceed. 
15 MR. LAMBERT: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, we 
16 had courtesy copies of all of the memoranda directed to your 
17 court yesterday. I hope you got those. 
18 THE COURT: I believe I have most of everything, I 
19 think — yours, your (inaudible) and the other side 
20 (inaudible). 
21 MR. LAMBERT: Correct. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. LAMBERT: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, we also filed a motion to 
25 strike their late filed reply memorandum, perhaps that should 
- 3 -
] I b e mil 11 essfjd I i J si . 
2 I MR. LAMBERT: And i f they wi sh to address that first, 
3 I I suppose if they wish to make a statement then 1 will respond. 
} I T l l i i 'i >ni' i i it ' i . 
5 MR, DUNN jf J may, your Honor, it's our position 
6 that the briefing requirements that the Biules of Procedure 
J ' pirovi de • -
8 THE COURT: I know all those nil es. 
9 MR. DUNN: Oka,} One reason that it makes a really 
] 0 t i g c:l :i f f e r enc € i s t:h a !:  t: h ey c o n t en ci :i n t: h e i i: J! a s 1: r ep ] y 
] 1 memorandum a position that they attribute to us that we don't 
12 take They have misinformed the Cour t that it is our position 
1 3 1:1 La t: they are enti tied to a credit of $350,000, regardless of 
] 4 the 1: u] i ng wi th reference to the release on the basis that the 
1 5 Joi nt Obligor's Act in some fashion gives them entitlement as a 
16 joint
 0t>iig0r with the American States Insurance Company for 
1 7 the payments that .American States made by vina*-
18 contractual obligation, and Mr. Peterson, because •-; * r,«-
] 9 insurance pol icy that they had wi th Mr. Peterser: r* r>os:tion 
2 0 . . an< I I .he Ha] I ::!:<i>i! I • . - - ... . 
21 \^ii '.**'- ar*> sonehow co-obligors of American States; Coca-Jc-la 
22 and therefore Hartford's obligation i s one based on tort, and 
2 3 t l i € I ' M 11.1 a 1 1 r 111« I 11 n 1 Iune 1 11 • a 11 S t a 1 i \ 1: II1 /i v t 1  111 11 HI S ei 1 o n 
24 contract. 
25 Indeed if their reply memorandum would have been filed 
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1 in a timely fashion we could have presented to the Court the 
2 release and trust agreement that Mr. Peterson signed with the 
3 American States Insurance Company, under which he assigned by 
4 way of subrogation the rights to recover the $300,000 that 
5 American States paid under their underinsured motorist policy 
6 obligation, and in fact this lawsuit is pursuant of their 
7 subrogation rights, as well as the rights that Mr. Peterson 
8 himself has to recover against Coca-Cola. 
9 It seems to me that the rules should be adhered to 
10 with reference to a brief as lengthy as this one, and as 
11 misinforming as to the effect of the joint obligor and co-
12 obligor statute, and their rights to set off. 
13 We do agree that they're entitled to a credit for the 
14 amounts paid by Nationwide Insurance on behalf of Mr. Steingel, 
15 an employee of Coca-Cola, but he is in a totally different 
16 relationship as the Joint Obligor's Act clearly points out is 
17 American States. Thank you, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lambert? 
19 MR. LAMBERT: If I might, your Honor, let me briefly 
20 address the motion to strike, which astonished me beyond words. 
21 When we were discussing this motion, Mr. Goodwill, who filed 
22 the motion to strike, and I discussed when we would file the 
23 motion, because we had talked about this motion for a long 
24 time, and when I would supply — I mean he would supply a 
25 response because he had problems responding in May because of 
5 ome :> t h e i: s c h edu 3 1 lid c o n f 1 i c t s
 t i: „ nd ; • = we i e s u p p o s e d t: c • f i 3 e 
d i s c u s s a ^ r . ^ i*.-* ~ > - . * - : c : -.t.* ; K I : e x t e n s i o n * .ir-
*t « . : : * t- * . somewha A a . , . * ^ » ^ & *. - , fi.,iu: 
6 *o solv*- p r o b l e i r a , . id, - n . ^ M : : a: . f a v e &." 
1 ^- - - * .na a o z e n s of 
8 -.-,: - + . ., . 1 ; i , e ^n J; >^e.\_ ^ : a ^ ^ . ^ ^ ( i n a u d i b l e ) 
9 - * - ^ < :*-: : ' r w r r y vf : •> r; . r. - : ,,* *h • t- a ^ a . ; . i n e s 
10 A r o u n a t r i e t i m e t n a t t n e i< memo wai * . e. . 
11 J . , t h i s P n n r t P ^ I - -— w^ b a d ^ * . . c u s s i o n s v : * : v c u i . o r k , 
12 a- \ * . , . " -: ** , , ^ : c n l a r l f f^ - i g r e e f- a m u t u a l t : r u « m 
13 * whj.cn we -"•"": ' ' - s m o t i o n u n t u i u ,. 
I I ?e a r e p l y memo i i . a . i u*-. i e r 
15 . th> i ^ l - i . / : Hi l ier we J _ t* T h i s I'nim. , ii ;.. „ * i ^ n t - - . : 
16 ma* ^* d i f f e r e n c e b e c a u s * V P ha • -a h e a r i n g H a t e * *-*t isi 
] ; • 
18 rad-r - <- «•-~ s c h e d u l e ar« w< **-.*« * i t : f i,- f i l e 
19 ' i t ™.L — ^ - + * fi • * o ' d ' ' ' *-* * si a n y p i e - ' u c L . c e . 
2 0 ' r 
21 | d i s c u s s i b l e * * J J W . , . *r , i;, «., . , , .« e>rt~-> 
22 1 l e n c * . , G o o d w i l . *v '->«: - ^ ,^ -. * : . 
23 
24 
extension oi time, as Mr. booo., had 
qranfed 
25 { Frankly, ?_* dealings v.t;. • office 
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1 for a decade — for 20 years, I have never had a motion to 
2 strike based on this, and I will admit — I am astonished, 
3 astonished at Mr. Dunn's argument this morning that the reason 
4 it is prejudicial — because this was not raised in the motion 
5 to strike — is because we raised a new argument. 
6 Let me quote from our original motion. "We move as an 
7 alternative that we get credit by $350,000, the amount already 
8 paid to him by Mr. Steingel's liability carrier." We raised 
9 this issue in our original memorandum and our original motion. 
10 It was not contested in the reply memo, and so whatever 
11 argument that Mr. Dunn wishes to raise today was not raised in 
12 their memo, even though we raised the issue in our original 
13 motion. 
14 Now he has an opportunity to argue it, but it is not 
15 true we've surprised somebody here. This is our position from 
16 the very beginning, and frankly, the surprise in this case is 
17 that they now are raising an objection to the argument that was 
18 raised in our original memorandum. 
19 I suggest to the Court that there is no prejudice to 
20 our admittedly late filing, and we simply ask the Court to 
21 exercise its discretion and not to strike our memorandum. 
22 Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Very well. 
24 MR. DUNN: May I briefly respond, your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: You may. 
- 7 -
,M.B DUNN: I i i s. .t I won] d 1 i k:e to clean up just a few 
misapprehensions. Mr Lambert indicated that I had said that 
- ' i , * ***..* *- , r :+ lr - - ,r* rf>~^ -*- «rgument. 
y 
c t r o n g *.* i t h e y : aK& * ne : j s . i t i o n \ v ^ do 
-«,:•- vi~ . : ^ : F - - * > *~ — *~ r — a r g u m e n t :•• *-r - r i a . - t i f f 
1 e d 
* »*i*- -: e c i : v : -i. n. t . < . 
THE COURT: AT • v- -.: ror/f-r r ft -
t. 
THE COURT: i .inaudible) .i: ..; . *-* v 
THE COURT: :r : n- -epl\ : .r* w< j. , :f v ' :K* _ 
*d^ l -wcs, uuwi: . J. -jagt- • : ontests the obligation 
c: the co-cbliuoi . and i iic eo-ol . : ?c : : r i situation . s 
> , ' uv. x,^  ^ :^.ijw:f Ste^nge. w:th 
A s* ; i J€- - \a 
Lambert's relationship w:i th myself goes back probably eat"!' 
lave always given him extensions whenever he has 
requested it, He has apparently had some conversations w:i th 
" r^  Goodwill that ' - - • .a - x 
suspect we woul d have granted one, and indeed the Court 
25 I pleases, however the Cour t would like to handle the memorandum 
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1 is all right with me, 
2 I have great respect for Mr. Lambert, and with that 
3 deference in mind, if we can raise the issue of challenging 
4 their interpretation of co-obligation and trust (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: (Inaudible) raised the issue early in the 
6 game so that we (inaudible) so I'll allow (inaudible). 
7 MR. DUNN: May we submit to the Court a copy of the 
8 agreement between Mr. Peterson and American States so that the 
9 Court can have it? 
10 THE COURT: You may. 
11 MR. DUNN: I believe we have a copy that we can submit 
12 at this time. May I approach the bench? 
13 MR. LAMBERT: Do you have a copy for me, Mr. Dunn, 
14 because I don't believe we've ever been supplied with one. 
15 MR. DUNN: Can we get a copy made for him? 
16 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Dunn, you may proceed. 
17 MR. DUNN: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Lambert said 
18 that $350,000 was paid by Mr. Steingel. I believe that's a 
19 misstatement. Fifty was paid by Mr. Steingel's insurance 
20 carrier, Nationwide, and $350,000 was paid by American States. 
21 I think we all know that. 
22 MR. LAMBERT: I respect Mr. Dunn as well. We have 
23 filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and we have made 
24 three arguments for the Court's consideration. 
25 First of all, we have argued that the relief executed 
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1 by the plaintiff, Stephen Peterson, his wife, Gail Peterson, 
2 and their attorney, Mr. Goodwill released Swire for any 
3 vicarious liability for the actions of Thomas Steingel, their 
4 employee. 
5 THE COURT: I don't mean to cut you off, Mr. Lambert, 
6 but I've read these memos and I think the critical issue here 
7 is the interaction between the two (inaudible) and why 
8 vicarious liability (inaudible) Section 15 — I mean Title 15 
9 versus the other (inaudible) to prevail, why don't* you discuss 
10 those. 
11 MR. LAMBERT: All right, I will be happy to, because 
12 we don't — under the Court's ruling it's not that complicated. 
13 We can argue back and forth about the various decisions, but 
14 the controlling decision is Nelson vs. The LPS Church or 
15 presiding bishopric, and the citation is 935 P.2d 512. It is a 
16 1997 decision, and in this case — and of course, I encourage 
17 the Court to review that decision, but in that case the Court 
18 refused the history of vicarious liability in this context. 
19 Originally Utah and most states said that the release 
20 of an agent released the principal. Then Utah adopted the 
21 J Comparative Negligence Act, and the Court says that under the 
22 I Comparative Negligence Act they conceded that the release of an 
23 agent didn't necessarily release the principal, and then Utah 
24 substituted the Comparative Negligence Act for the Liability 
25 Reform Act, and in that act, the Liability Reform Act, they 
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1 I changed the definition of defendant to define defendant 
2 essentially as a person with fault* 
3 And the Supreme Court refused that history in Nelson 
4 because both sides were arguing about the interpretations of 
5 the act. It involves the same issue involved in this case, and 
6 that is was — we had the release of an agent, the scout master 
7 as I recall, and the question is was his release — did it 
8 amount to the release of the principal, in other words the 
9 church. 
10 Once the Utah Supreme Court, after reviewing the 
11 history that I just reviewed, the Utah Supreme Court held — 
12 and they reviewed that argument and said, "Notwithstanding the 
13 reliance of the parties in their briefs on the competing 
14 interpretations of the Liability Reform Act, we conclude that 
15 this case may be resolved pursuant to the Joint Obligations 
16 Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 15-4-1 through Section 15-4-
17 5." So they said, "We don't need to resolve those differences, 
18 what controls in this case, an agent principle case, is the 
19 liability is the Joint Obligations Act." 
20 Then they cite and quote the provisions of 15-4-4. 
21 "The obligee's," and the obligee is obviously in this case the 
22 plaintiff or the claimant, "release or discharge of one or more 
23 of several obligors or of one or more joint or of joint several 
24 obligors," so in other words, the plaintiff's release of this 
25 obligor, "shall not discharge co-obligors against upholding the 
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1 obligee in writing and as part of the same transaction as the 
2 release or discharge expressly reserves his rights." 
3 NOW in the Nelson case our Supreme Court noted that in 
4 that case the release expressly reserved the rights against the 
5 church. They said, "The agreement stated that plaintiff did 
6 not intend to release the church and specifically reserved all 
7 claims against the church." 
8 Now in the release at issue here there is a 
9 reservation of rights, but that reservation goes to the 
10 underinsured motorist carriers or American States. There is no 
11 express reservation of rights against an employer, and 
12 therefore under the Joint Obligations Act and the 
13 interpretation thereof by the Utah Supreme Court, because those 
14 rights weren't reserved, then the principal is released by the 
15 release of not only the agent, but all other companies and 
16 persons, et cetera. 
17 Now just to make it clear, the Joint Obligations Act 
18 limits that language to 15-4-5, which is admittedly a fairly 
19 obtuse section. But there are two sections. One is — and the 
20 first one is in the first paragraph that talks about if an 
21 obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express 
22 reservation of rights against the co-obligor — that's what 
23 we've got here — then knows or has reason to know that the 
24 obligor release or discharge didn't pay as much of the claim. 
25 Mr. Goodwill in his reply memorandum argues that he 
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1 | didn't know or have reason to know. So the first section does 
2 | not apply, but even if it did apply, it's clear that it doesn't 
3 I apply to this case. 
4 The second section says, MIf an obligee's so releasing 
5 or discharging an obligor is not then such knowledge or reason 
6 to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be 
7 satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts; A) the 
8 amount of the fractional share of the obligor release or 
9 discharge." 
10 Frankly, I have no idea what that was language means. 
11 If we have a 50/50 partner, I know what it means, or if there 
12 was an agreement amongst the obligors, I know what it means, 
13 but what we have here is the right of an indemnity of an 
14 employer against an employee for the employee's vicarious 
15 negligent act. So 100 percent ultimately of the share is to be 
16 assigned to the employee, but we don't need to resolve that 
17 because B) is the lesser of the two amounts. It says, "B) the 
18 amount that such obligor was bound," and that's Mr. Steingel, 
19 "was bound by a contract or relation with the co-obligor to 
20 pay." 
21 Well, Utah law and law universally makes it clear that 
22 when a principal, in this case an employer, is liable in 
23 (inaudible) superial or under the principles of agency to the 
24 acts of employees, to the extent of vicarious liability, the 
25 principal has the right to indemnity over against the agent or 
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1 the employee. 
2 So under that provision, Mthe amount which such 
3 obligor was bound by its contract or relation," that's what we 
4 have here, -with the co-obligor, the employer, to pay." Well, 
5 that's 100 percent of the liability that is vicarious, and 
6 that's what our motion goes to. 
7 So under the Joint Obligations Act, which our Supreme 
8 Court in Nelson has held applies to this very situation, if 
9 rights were not reserved they are released, and that seems 
10 crystal clear under the Nelson decision. Despite all of the 
11 confusion or the multiple cases, it is resolved by our Supreme 
12 Court's most recent ruling that — in resolving those two 
13 statutes. 
14 Now let me address the other arguments briefly as 
15 well. Despite taking of the money and releasing Steingel, the 
16 plaintiff now wants to claim some seven years later that the 
17 release is void, and they make three arguments. 
18 First of all, they claim fraud. Now fraud has to be 
19 pled by nine elements, or there are nine elements that have to 
20 be proved by clear and convincing evidence. There is not one 
21 shred of evidence cited in this case that Mr. Steingel, that 
22 his insurer, Nationwide, or that Swire made any fraudulent 
23 statements at all to the Petersons or their attorney. There's 
24 just no evidence of fraud. 
25 There's no evidence at all that my client, Swire, knew 
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1 | about or even participated in these settlement negotiations. 
2 | The only thing they suggest is that there may be some kind of 
3 I affirmative duty to tell Peterson all of the relevant facts. 
4 Well, there is no legal precedent for that proposition. In 
5 fact, we cite in our memorandum John Call Engineering, a case 
6 that makes clear that there is no issue to explain to the 
7 opposite side all of the impacts of the release. There is no 
8 evidence of fraud. 
9 The second argument they make is that it is mutual 
10 mistake. Now the agreement failed to conform to both — and 
11 that requires that the agreement failed to conform to both 
12 parties' intentions, and that in this case the plaintiff was 
13 mistaken about the effect of the release, and the party that he 
14 is releasing knew of this mistake and kept quiet. 
15 There is no evidence to establish mutual mistake. I, 
16 of course, can't talk about what was in Mr. Peterson's mind or 
17 his wife's mind or in their counsel's mind, but there is no 
18 evidence in the record that Mr. Steingel or his insurer or 
19 Swire, what their intentions were with respect to the release 
20 of the employer, or that they understood that there was an 
21 intention upon — by Mr. Peterson. 
22 At very best this is a unilateral mistake, although I 
23 don't think it was a mistake at all, what they did was move on 
24 to the next stage of their negotiations and knew what they were 
25 doing. But at most it's a unilateral mistake. There's not a 
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1 shred of evidence of a mutual mistake here. 
2 Then the third argument that troubles me made that 
3 they would raise at this late date is that Mr. Peterson was 
4 incompetent at the time he executed the release. Now they do 
5 not present any evidence that that was the case. The only 
6 evidence that they present is that in December of 1997, nearly 
7 three and a half years — no, four and a half years after the 
8 release was signed, Gail Peterson, Mrs. Peterson, was appointed 
9 as guardian and conservator for Stephen Peterson. 
10 My comments about that is first of all, it's not 
11 evident that he was incompetent at the time that he signed the 
12 release, something that took place four and a half — nearly 
13 four and a half years later. Secondly, although she may have 
14 been appointed conservator, it is not evident that he was 
15 incompetent. 
16 Now this wasn't done in this lawsuit. It was done ex 
17 parte because I suspect the plaintiff's counsel knew that we 
18 would have vigorously opposed what appears to me to be strictly 
19 a strategic effort on their part, but we didn't know about this 
20 contingence, we didn't know about this appointment until the 
21 reply memo was filed, the first time it was ever revealed to 
22 us. I contend seriously that there is no medical doctor who 
23 has declared Mr. Peterson incompetent, and frankly, I think 
24 it's a disservice to Mr. Peterson. 
25 The neuropsychological testing in this case by 
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plaintiff's experts and defendant's experts alike put him in 
the normal range of virtually every subtest they performed. 
Now there is a big difference and a genuine argument 
and disagreement among the parties about whether Mr. Peterson 
was injured, but that is far different than claiming that he is 
incompetent, which is a far different standard. 
Third, this release was not signed only by Mr. 
Peterson, but it was signed by Gail Peterson, who is — was his 
wife, is his wife, and also is now the appointed conservator. 
It is also signed by their lawyer as witness, who was there to 
explain the effect of a release to them. So it wasn't signed 
only by the plaintiff, who they now claim or suggest is 
incompetent, but by his future conservator and by their lawyer, 
and under these circumstances in the very (inaudible) that is a 
ratification of the settlement agreement, its waiver is 
estoppel from asserting an argument these many years later that 
a release signed in 1992 is voidable. 
Now the other portion of our — well, there's two 
other portions of our motion for partial summary judgment. One 
is that if the release doesn't release the principal, as we 
clearly believe that it does, we are entitled to that money 
which was paid in behalf of the tortfeasor, that is paid in his 
behalf because it is based on his liability. 
Now Mr. Dunn says that he would like to argue about 
that, and since I don't know what his arguments are, I will 
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1 wait and listen to what his argument is. It is clear that in 
2 our original motion and memorandum we argued that we were 
3 entitled to a credit of $350,000, There was no mystery or 
4 hiding of that argument. It is equally clear, if you will 
5 review the reply memorandum, that they did not resist that 
6 effort. Indeed, they concede that we're entitled to a credit. 
7 So this is a brand new argument today made for the first time 
8 in this case that we're not entitled to the credit of the 
9 $350,000. 
10 Finally, we argued as a matter of law in this case 
11 there is not a basis for punitive damages. Obviously Utah law 
12 allows punitive damages only in the most extraordinary cases. 
13 They must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, it has to 
14 be evident, not mere allegation, and the tortfeasor — in this 
15 case, Mr. Steingel — had to deliberately manifest a knowing 
16 and reckless indifference. In other words, he had to act 
17 intentionally and with reckless indifference, which meant that 
18 he was aware of a high degree of probability that serious harm 
19 would result to another and that his conduct was highly 
20 outrageous, it was outrageous. 
21 Now Mr. Steingel's falling asleep at the wheel and 
22 going across the line at 9th East is not a case for punitive 
23 damages, and that is just the very initial inquiry. Even if 
24 his conduct was punitive in nature, that does not mean the 
25 employer is liable under some theory of vicarious liability. 
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The circumstances under which an employer might be held liable 
for the punitive conduct of the employee is outlined in Johnson 
vs. Rogers, a newspaper corporation agency. The Supreme Court 
said there was a factual issue in that case because the 
employer failed to discover the DUI history of this driver when 
they hired him. 
Secondly, they were aware that he came to work 
intoxicated and was aware that he drank on the job, and 
thirdly, that supervisors participated in the consumption of 
alcohol and drugs with the tortfeasor and others. That is not 
this case. 
There are four circumstances under which an issue can 
be created. First, a principal or managerial agent — well, 
that's not true here. Nobody contends that Mr. Steingel was a 
principal of the company. 
Secondly, the agent was unfit and the employer was 
reckless in employing him or retaining him. Now the only 
evidence at all on this issue is that one manager testified 
19 I that "he was not one of our better employees." That doesn't 
20 mean that he was an unfit driver, because there is absolutely 
21 no evidence in this case that Mr. Steingel had a habit of 
22 falling asleep, that he had a bad driving record, either before 
23 he was hired or while he was hired. So there is no evidentiary 
24 support towards that. 
25 The third is ratification or approval of the act. 
-19-
1 Again, there is no evidence in this case that there was any 
2 ratification applauds approval of what happened to Mr. 
3 Steingel. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. They 
4 found it a preventable accident, but they suggest we didn't 
5 punish him, we didn't discipline him. Well, that evidence 
6 isn't in the record, but even if that were true, we have cited 
7 law that indicates the failure to discipline is not the same as 
8 ratification or approval of an act. There is no evidence that 
9 we approved of him falling asleep at the wheel. 
10 Finally, authorized the doings in the manner of the 
11 act. And what they suggest here is that we have done that 
12 because we have no policy against employees holding second 
13 jobs, and that indeed some people, at least, in the company 
14 were aware that he held a second job. But that does not 
15 establish any evidence that we were aware that he chose to work 
16 all night on the night of the accident, or that we were aware 
17 that he was exhausted, if in fact that was the case, or that we 
18 authorized him falling asleep on the job. 
19 Frankly, the argument against having a policy against 
20 others holding a job, frankly, there are some limits to privacy 
21 and rights to our ability to control people's off-duty contact. 
22 We can't tell people that they can't hold other jobs, or for 
23 that matter take night classes and stay up late studying, or 
24 have a baby that might cry all night so they're tired, or have 
25 a policy again telling them when they have to go to bed. That 
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1 argument, I think, is absurd on its face. 
2 Punitive damages are not intended to provide 
3 plaintiffs with additional compensation or settlement leverage. 
4 These courts frequently dismiss punitive damage allegations and 
5 make it clear they should only go to a jury in exceptional 
6 circumstances to deter outrageous and malicious conduct, and 
7 that is simply not the case either with the tortfeasor, Mr. 
8 Steingel, but more importantly, it's certainly not the case 
9 with my client, Swire. Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn? 
11 MR. DUNN: If the Court pleases, I'll address the 
12 motion for partial summary judgment except to the punitive 
13 damages suffered, Mr. Goodwill will address that. I don't know 
14 what we're doing on the time constraints here, but do you have 
15 a deadline that we can work towards? 
16 THE COURT: I have another case, I don't see anybody 
17 here yet. 
18 MR. DUNN: Okay. Your Honor, Coca-Cola is seeking to 
19 be unjustly enriched here at the expense of an injured party, 
20 to whom they are liable as tortfeasor for the desire to take 
21 advantage of somebody else's release, and indeed a desire to 
22 take advantage of somebody else's American States' payments for 
23 which they contributed nothing. The law now does not allow 
24 this. 
25 If you take a look at the (inaudible) of the cases 
-21-
1 that have been handed down by the Supreme Court and the court 
2 of appeals since the adoption of the Liability Reform Act in 
3 1986, it is clear that in order to take advantage of provision 
4 I of release, you've got to have some participation in the 
5 (inaudible). 
6 Nelson vs. the Church, the Corporation of the 
7 Presiding Bishopric of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
8 Saints, this is the case that says — Mr. Lambert says is in 
9 some way controlling, acknowledges in its own first footnote — 
10 second footnote, that we don't get to the question that this 
11 case poses, although it tells us a whole lot about how they 
12 would rule if they did. 
13 In this case there was an intent to have a release 
14 that wasn't paid for by the church to protect the church — the 
15 very first sentence of the opinion says, "We hold that it does 
16 not—" the second sentence. 
17 The language in the decision repeatedly states the 
18 principles that ought to be followed, "A release given by a 
19 person seeking recovery through one or more defendants does not 
20 discharge any other defendant, unless the release so provides," 
21 and the — application of this case when they said— 
22 THE COURT: No, they addressed all the issues in that 
23 case, and the church, LDS Church, presiding bishopric was not 
24 released was because it was a special reservation (inaudible) 
25 and if it hadn't been for that special reservation the Court 
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1 advised that it would have found in favor of the defendant. 
2 That's my reading of the case. 
3 I MR. DUNN: No, that's not my interpretation of the 
4 I case. What the case says is — in footnote 2, for example, 
5 "Plaintiff argues that the church's fault for purposes of the 
6 LRA is imputed from the acts of Crabtree (phonetic). Thus they 
7 contend that the church is a defendant under the LRA because we 
8 find, however, that the Joint Obligors Act specifically 
9 addresses these issues, we do not need to determine the merits 
10 of plaintiff's interpretation." 
11 In footnote 3, "We recognize in Krukowitz that Section 
12 78-27-42 of the CNA was a pro tanto repeal of Section 15-4-4 of 
13 the Joint Obligors Act. To the extent that the LRA still 
14 addresses regular co-defendants who are liable because of 
15 fault, the LRA will supersede or act as pro tanto repeal of 
16 Sections 15-4-4 as to those defendants." 
17 THE COURT: Now all that's saying is if you have a 
18 bunch of defendants involved in a lawsuit that you're not going 
19 to be releasing them unless there's a specific release of them. 
20 But if it's a vicarious liability, which is what they seem to 
21 be saying that happened with the church in that case, it would 
22 fall under Title 15, and that under Title 15 they are liable 
23 because there was a specific reservation against them. If they 
24 had to be specific, they (inaudible) liable. 
25 MR. DUNN: Well, let's assume that the Court is 
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15-4-
talk 
is 
unable to understand, comes into play even if you leave 15-4-4 
in place. What he didn't read from 15-4-4 was the last phrase, 
"and in the absence of such a reservation of rights shall 
discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in Section 
15-4-5." So if there isn't a specific enumeration, then what 
do you do? You take a look at 15-4-5, and I've suggested that 
this is the interpretation of (inaudible) applies, and the 
Court will apply, the first paragraph, "If you know about the 
existence of a co-obligor," and we didn't know about the 
existence of a co-obligor so we go to the second paragraph, "If 
an obligee's so releasing or discharging an obligor is not then 
such knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against 
the co-obligor—" if you don't know that Coca-Cola exists, if 
they 
mean 
for, 
who 
Mr. 
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1 which I also signed, was in a position where the injuries he 
2 received were severe, the financial conditions that they were 
3 under were severe. He settled the claim with Steingel. He did 
4 not settle the claim with Coca-Cola. Indeed the burden of 
5 proof by virtue of other cases that the Supreme Court and the 
6 court of appeals have handed down are clearly on the person 
7 seeking the effect of the release. 
8 There is no showing in the evidence that there is a 
9 "should have known" situation. They were only told that he was 
10 the driver, they were not told that Coca-Cola was employing him 
11 at the time. Coca-Cola knew about it within hours of the 
12 accident having occurred. That's in the transcript of— 
13 THE COURT: No, they're not saying they didn't know 
14 about the accident. 
15 MR. DUNN: They knew about the accident and didn't 
16 come forward. They're the undisclosed principal here. If an 
17 obligation exists on anybody's part, it makes an affirmative 
18 action to establish what the facts were, the obligation was on 
19 Coca-Cola. But Coca-Cola didn't come forward and say, "Mr. 
20 Steingel is our employee, we're also responsible for his 
21 actions." Coca-Cola hid in the bushes and then comes out later 
22 and says, "Neiner, neiner, we've got you, you signed a release, 
23 a release is a general release." 
24 THE COURT: (Inaudible) hid in the bushes. 
25 MR. DUNN: (Inaudible) they didn't do anything. 
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1 | THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
2 | MR. DUNN: To find out if there (inaudible). So then 
3 | we come to paragraph 2 in 15-4-5, "If an obligee's so releasing 
4 | or discharging an obligor is not then such knowledge or reason 
5 I to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be 
6 satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely 
7 the amount of the fractional share of the obligor released or 
8 discharged," and I suggest to you that that means the amount of 
9 money that was paid, "or B) the amount that such obligor was 
10 bound by his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay," 
11 and if it is bound by his contract, the contract was the 
12 contract of release. The contract of release was the $50,000 
13 amount they paid. 
14 Indeed if you look at the Nelson vs. Church decision, 
15 they talk about the offset portion. On the last full paragraph 
16 of the majority opinion, "The fact that the employee had been 
17 released in the settlement has no bearing on the continued 
18 liability of the employer, unless the settlement is in full 
19 satisfaction of a plaintiff's claims against both the employee 
20 and the employer moreover under Section 15-4-3 of the Joint 
21 Obligations Act, an amount received by one obligor is being 
22 credited against the amount owed by the rest." So their 
23 interpretation there is that the offset or credit amount is the 
24 amount received from the one obligor. 
25 THE COURT: That didn't satisfy your issue about the 
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1 $300,000. 
2 MR. DUNN: I agree. The release provisions also take 
3 us back to the line of cases that came before Nelson, since 
4 Nelson by virtue of its own acknowledgement in the footnote 
5 doesn't control our situation. 
6 THE COURT: Why doesn't it? 
7 MR. DUNN: Pardon me? 
8 THE COURT: Why doesn't it? Because they don't get to 
9 that issue? 
10 MR. DUNN: Yeah, they don't get to that issue. So the 
11 cases that 1997 December 18th, the court of appeals in a 
12 situation of following the Nelson vs. the Church decision, in 
13 this case the plaintiff, Bonnie Thornock, appealed the trial 
14 court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, 
15 Dorothy Jensen. Plaintiff contends that the release upon which 
16 the defendant relied was ineffective as to the defendant 
17 because it listed the defendant's husband (inaudible) defendant 
18 as the person released. In essence what the decision says is 
19 that they are to interpret — this is on page 2 of the decision 
20 as printed, "Accordingly we interpret the statute as consistent 
21 with standard public policy." 
22 The public policy is as stated on page 5, which 
23 relates back to Krukowitz again, "The statute is inapplicable 
24 because release here was given to someone who does not qualify 
25 as a defendant under the narrow reading of the statute defeats 
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1 the purpose of the statute, which was to retain the liability 
2 of tortfeasors who are not named in the release." The public 
3 policy is to retain liability of tortfeasors not specifically 
4 named in the release. That's the standard. 
5 THE COURT: (Inaudible) when we talk about vicarious 
6 liability, you are (inaudible) Title 15 and not Title 78, 
7 weren't they? Isn't that what they say? 
8 MR. DUNN: No, I don't think that they say that in 
9 Nelson and in Krukowitz, they say that the Liability Reform Act 
10 provision controls. The decision in Thornock vs. Jensen was 
11 subsequent to Nelson vs. the Church. 
12 The decision goes on to say, "To give effect to the 
13 statute clarified by our Supreme Court, the focus must remain 
14 on the tortfeasors seeking the protection of a release, even 
15 though not specifically named in it, not the fortuitous 
16 circumstances of whether a party named in the release is really 
17 claimed to be at fault. According to the release of Lowell 
18 Jensen did not also release the defendant." 
19 The case makes additional statements about how the 
20 interpretation of the releases in the statute are to be made so 
21 as to not make the statute absurd, and a reasonable and 
22 sensible construction has to be the construction that's 
23 adopted. 
24 On the last page of the decision, page 5, "There is no 
25 legitimate occasion for giving a release to someone against 
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1 whom there has been no claim. If such a release is obtained it 
2 will be the product of a stake, or worse, someone (inaudible) 
3 or either a (inaudible) plaintiff exhorting the innocent or 
4 devious defendant tricking an unwary plaintiff." 
5 If there was a mistake, the Court in this decision 
6 takes the position that if there was an occurrence, such as a 
7 mistake in giving the release, that such an occurrence would 
8 simply not be possible if the insurance adjuster merely added 
9 the name of the vehicle and driver to the release instead of 
10 relying on boiler plate language to make it effective. That 
11 is, if the adjuster for Nationwide had desired that the release 
12 be effective to protect Coca-Cola, he could have easily placed 
13 that in the release. That wasn't the intent of the release, 
14 that wasn't the purpose of the release. 
15 If an honest mistake occurs in the process it is not 
16 equitable that that burden fall — excuse me, it is not 
17 inequitable that that burden fall on the insurance company 
18 which is in the position to properly instruct and supervise the 
19 employees. 
20 Here they're even a step back from that because in our 
21 situation the defendant, Coca-Cola, is attempting to take 
22 advantage of something for which they paid nothing and didn't 
23 participate in, and in fact essentially kind of failed to 
24 disclose the fact that this gentleman driving the vehicle was 
25 their employee. 
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If you go back to the Nelson vs. the Church argument, 
why should a release of someone that you know about that 
maintains your rights to pursue a cause of action against 
someone that you know about prevents you from being able to get 
past the release where you would have included them in it had 
you known about them, but you didn't know about them, which 
takes us back to that second paragraph in 15-4-5 of the Joint 
Obligors Act, 
Another example of a case that the court of appeals 
handed down in the 1990's, 1993, is Crowse vs. Utah State 
Department of Transportation. In that case the statute 
governing releases did not require the automatic nullification 
of the release as to parties not expressly named or precisely 
described in the document. 
They adopted what they call the intent rule for 
interpreting releases, and the intent rule is that tortfeasors, 
in order to take advantage of the release, must prove that the 
parties to the agreement intended them to be the beneficiary of 
the release. Specifically in Crowse on page 1,017— 
THE COURT: Is this a Title 15 case or is this a Title 
78 case? 
MR. DUNN: 1993, Crowse vs. Utah State Department of 
Transportation, 852 P.2d 1014, "On March 13, 1987 Crowse, at 
the advice of his attorney, signed a document releasing his 
parents, the driver and their insurance company and any and all 
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1 I other persons, firms and corporations herein named or referred 
2 I to or not from any and all causes of action in exchange for 
3 | $200,000 of the liability policy limits for the driver and the 
4 I owner of the car. 
5 "UDOT paid no consideration for the release, did not 
6 participate in the negotiations incident to the release. 
7 Indeed, UDOT was apparently unaware that such negotiations were 
8 taking place." That's the fact situation that's (inaudible). 
9 THE COURT: There's a huge difference in that case. 
10 The huge difference is is the State of Utah is not an obligor 
11 in that case, they are a defendant (inaudible). In that case 
12 (inaudible) that were claiming, isn't that right, and so they 
13 were suing because of the— 
14 MR. DUNN: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: —the road construction (inaudible). The 
16 State of Utah is a defendant. The State of Utah didn't have 
17 any obligation to the other defendants as a joint obligor 
18 that's all under Title 15 (inaudible). 
19 MR. DUNN: Correct, but the principle remains the same 
20 that the intent of interpreting a release should look into the 
21 question of whether or not the released parties were intended 
22 to be beneficiaries of the release— 
23 THE COURT: Well— 
24 MR. DUNN: On page 1023, "Second, when a party not 
25 specifically named in the release tends to prevail himself of 
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the release, that party bears the burden of proving that it was 
the intended beneficiary of the release." There is nothing to 
show that Coca-Cola was ever intended as the beneficiary of 
this release. They certainly paid nothing towards obtaining 
it. What they want to do is avoid what is their liability to 
Mr. Peterson for the injuries he sustained by virtue of this 
claim that they should have preserved the rights against the 
defendant they didn't even know existed, an undisclosed 
principal. 
THE COURT: I think you've made your point. 
MR. DUNN: Indeed if you take a look at the dissent 
that Justice Russon wrote in Nelson vs. the Corporation of the 
Church of Jesus Christ, his dissent is essentially the position 
that Mr. Lambert would have you take. He's saying that the 
release should apply to anybody that's in the position of — 
I'm not quite sure I can make that statement. 
His opinion in Childs vs. Newsome in 1995 — this 
18 involves another release. In this case Dale Childs sued Andrea 
19 Newsome, and on July 22nd, 1991, Dale Childs agreed to a 
20 settlement of his claims against Dellers and Jessie's parents. 
21 The settlement terms provided that Dellers' insurer, American 
22 States, paid Childs the policy limits of $50,000 in exchange 
23 for Childs' signing a release discharging Dellers, American 
24 States and all other agents together with all other firms 
25 (inaudible) corporations from any liability arising from the 
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1 act — so this is Title 78 again. 
2 The philosophy of releases adopted even by Justice 
3 Russon, Section 78-27-42 was enacted to repeal Section 15-4-4 
4 of the Joint Obligors Act, which has codified common law rule 
5 that a release of one joint tortfeasor also released all other 
6 joint tortfeasors, and then it cites Krukowitz vs. Draper/ 
7 which is another case worthy of the Court's review. 
8 So not only does Krukowitz say that 15-4-4 has been 
9 repealed by 78-27-42 in 1995 in this case, the decision goes on 
10 to say immediately thereafter, "The statute was designed to 
11 retain the liability of tortfeasors and reverse the common law 
12 rule so that the release of one joint tortfeasor did not 
13 automatically release all tortfeasors." 
14 The last sentence in the opinion before the conclusion 
15 is, "Thus, pursuant to Section 78-27-42, a release must contain 
16 the language either naming the defendant or identifying the 
17 defendant with some degree of specificity in order to discharge 
18 that defendant from liability." It strikes me that in the face 
19 of this decision, to say that the overruled Section of 15-4-4 
20 that the Supreme Court in Childs says has now been repealed by 
21 the enactment of 78-27-42, and then to, in my opinion, torture 
22 that construction so as to not apply the following sections as 
23 inappropriate. 
24 Krukowitz is another case which, I think, gives us 
25 guidance from the point of view of the policy that ought to be 
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1 | adopted, the public policy that if you pay for a release you 
2 | ought to be released, if you don't pay for the release and you 
3 | don't participate in any fashion, you ought not be able to take 
4 I advantage of the release. 
5 The case overturns a Homestead vs. Abbott and out of 
6 the GMC diesel decision, cited approval and under 78-27-42 
7 talks about the pro tanto repeal of 15-4-4 — this is on page 2 
8 of the decision, Section 78-27-42 is, quote, "by a necessary 
9 implication," end quote, a pro tanto repeal of 15-4-4 of the 
10 Joint Obligors Act. Then it goes on to say that that falls — 
11 a Utah law review article written by (inaudible) called 
12 comparative negligence contribution amongst joint tortfeasors. 
13 The decision, as I indicated, also has three quotes 
14 that I'd like to read to the Court about what is being sought— 
15 THE COURT: What case are you talking about now? 
16 MR. DUNN: This is Krukowitz, K-r-u-k— 
17 THE COURT: I have a copy. 
18 MR. DUNN: —versus Draper. If the Court would like 
19 copies of these cases we certainly can— 
20 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
21 MR. DUNN: "Although the employer and employee are not 
22 common law tortfeasors, they are nonetheless each obligated for 
23 the same thing, total reparations of the damages to the 
24 victim." 
25 Our situation is one where the employee is the 
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1 released party, the employer is not released, and not released 
2 because of, in part, the repeal of that statute. The reason 
3 that Nelson vs. the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ 
4 doesn't get to that argument is that they don't — they feel 
5 they don't need to get to that argument. 
6 "In sum, we hold in accord with the above authorities 
7 and for the reasons of which they are based that the term 
8 'joint tortfeasor' as used in 78-27-40(3) included the master 
9 who is vicariously liable for the negligence of a servant and 
10 the indemnity provisions of 78-27-41 preserves, quote, "any 
11 right of indemnity which may exist under the present law; 
12 therefore, Draper was not released by the release executed 
13 between the plaintiffs and the home." 
14 The next paragraph, "The indemnity language of 
15 78-27-41(2) of the Utah Act assures the continuance of the 
16 rights and obligations of vicariously liable persons. Thus, a 
17 person entitled to indemnity continues to be entitled to 
18 indemnity." That the person such as Mr. Peterson who is 
19 entitled to be compensated for his loss by a tortfeasor that 
20 didn't pay anything for a release is entitled to seek 
21 recompense from that tortfeasor. 
22 If you take a look at these cases you can torture the 
23 language of tortfeasor and defendant, and you can make the 
24 thing look one way or another, but as the court of appeals said 
25 in the (inaudible) decision, you try and make sense of it, what 
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1 makes sense of it. What makes sense of it is that you should 
2 not be able to take advantage of a release in which you weren't 
3 named, for which you didn't pay anything, and indeed it 
4 wouldn't have been brought about if you would have just stepped 
5 forward and acknowledged your existence. I just cite the Court 
6 to the portions of the brief relating to undisclosed principal. 
7 The last area I would like to address is — as a part 
8 of that — well, now I've got two things I wanted to talk 
9 about. Very briefly, with reference to vicarious liability 
10 (inaudible) talks about vicarious liability and being in this 
11 one sense strict liability, strict liability can be assessed in 
12 a comparative fault situation, so strict liability can go in as 
13 a defendant circumstance if you need to interpret the thing in 
14 accordance with what's a defendant and what's a tortfeasor. 
15 Last, competence of Mr. Peterson to execute the 
16 agreement. Judge Wilkinson has ruled that Mr. Peterson 
17 required a conservator. Mr. Lambert argued that there was not 
18 a statement from an MD that there was such situation, that such 
19 situation was not the case. If you take a look at attachment 
20 MF" to the memorandum, there is an evaluation done by a medical 
21 doctor, Dr. Peter Heinbecker, M.D. 
22 In the summary and conclusions he apparently — Mr. 
23 Peterson apparently suffered a frontal lobe injury which 
24 resulted in the psychological symptoms which would seem to 
25 include a lack of interest — lethargy, difficulty with 
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1 | mathematical calculations, difficulty remembering the names of 
2 I people and other short-term items, such as appointments, 
3 leaving words out in his writing, difficulty comprehending what 
4 he is reading, difficulty in following discussions, difficulty 
5 in finding words and losing his place when he is doing 
6 different projects— 
7 THE COURT: All that (inaudible). 
8 MR. DUNN: If Mr. Lambert takes the position that 
9 Elaine Clark's evaluation of Mr. Peterson some number of years 
10 later raises an issue of fact, then that becomes a fact issue 
11 as to whether or not the release could be executed by Mr. 
12 Peterson. 
13 THE COURT: What about the fact that his wife and his 
14 lawyer both signed? If he's incompetent then they are 
15 signing — shouldn't he be bound by it? Shouldn't his lawyer 
16 and his conservator be bound by what she agreed (inaudible)? 
17 MR. DUNN: It seems to me that if you are in a 
18 different position, the evaluation that you make of a 
19 document— 
20 THE COURT: (Inaudible) to say that he was competent 
21 enough to sign it in the eyes of his wife and his attorney four 
22 and a half years ago, but now let's make him incompetent. 
23 Isn't that what you're saying, let's make him incompetent now 
24 so the release isn't any good. 
25 MR. DUNN: What I'm saying is that we don't have to 
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1 get to that question at all. What I'm saying is we don't have 
2 to wrestle with the fact issues because the cases that the 
3 Court has come down with repeatedly over the years from 
4 Krukowitz o n — 
5 THE COURT: That's aside. You've raised this argument 
6 about incompetence. Let's not — don't say now, "Well, let's 
7 not talk about that," because I want you to rule on the first 
8 issue, and make this one moot. 
9 MR. DUNN: Well, that's the way I'd like the Court to 
10 find— 
11 THE COURT: I know that's what you want, but if you 
12 want to argue this case, the part about the competency, you 
13 have to address that. 
14 MR. DUNN: Okay, to address that, it strikes me that 
15 on a technical basis that if he was mentally incompetent at the 
16 time by virtue of the findings of Dr. Heinbecker, and it may be 
17 a fact question, then he didn't have the competence to sign the 
18 release. At that point in time neither his attorney nor his 
19 wife had the technical position that they could exercise to 
20 either evaluate it for him— 
21 THE COURT: (Inaudible) I'm saying incompetent when he 
22 signed. Yeah, you're saying he's incompetent now, are you 
23 saying (inaudible) problems. 
24 MR. DUNN: Again, technically, Judge Wilkinson says 
25 that he was. I thought that I made it clear but the report 
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1 I from Dr. Heinbecker was in, I think, March of 1983, 
2 I MR. LAMBERT: 1993. 
3 MR. DUNN: 1993. 
4 MR. LAMBERT: Not long after the accident. 
5 MR. DUNN: May 20, 1993. 
6 THE COURT: May 23, 1993? 
7 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: So then his attorney and his wife knew all 
9 of this information when they signed with him and had him sign. 
10 It seems to me that if there was a question of his competency 
11 is it that they agreed to sign on this document representing 
12 their views, anyway, he was certainly capable of doing it. 
13 MR. DUNN: She was not then his conservator. 
14 THE COURT: She's his wife. I mean she certainly, if 
15 anybody had concerns about his ability to do this, she would be 
16 the one who stepped forward, wouldn't she? 
17 MR. DUNN: When she testified in her deposition, she 
18 was concerned about his difficulty with handling a number of 
19 things, and it was the beginning of the injury. 
20 THE COURT: Very well. 
21 MR. DUNN: Mr. Peterson received a massive blow to the 
22 head—• 
23 THE COURT: (Inaudible) he was injured in the 
24 accident. I already accepted he had injuries from the 
25 accident. That doesn't address these other issues. I'm 
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1 | concerned about the fact that (inaudible) argument made that he 
2 | was competent enough to accept the money, but now that there's 
3 | another issue, all of a sudden he's now incompetent. Does that 
4 | mean that you're going to give the money back that the 
5 I insurance company gave him, the contract wasn't valid? 
6 MR. DUNN: That hasn't yet been evaluated. 
7 THE COURT: Very well. 
8 MR. DUNN: There's been no request in that regard. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we take a recess. Do you 
10 rest? Are you finished? 
11 MR. DUNN: I had just one quote, if I may, before 
12 turning it over to Mr. Goodwill. The Nelson vs. the Church 
13 opinion, upon which Mr. Lambert relies, right after the 
14 statement that a reliance upon the most has footnote 4 referred 
15 to it. Footnote 4 says, "The obligee's release or discharge of 
16 one or more of several obligors or of one or more of joint or 
17 joint and several obligors shall not discharge the co-obligors 
18 against whom the obligee in writing is a part of the same 
19 transaction as the release or discharge expressly reserves his 
20 rights, and in the absence of such a reservation of rights, 
21 shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in 
22 Section 15-4-5." We take the position that that's the $50,000. 
23 Thank you. 
24 MR. GOODWILL: If it pleases the Court and Mr. 
25 Lambert, I've been asked to argue the punitive damage portion 
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1 of the case. 
2 Essentially, your Honor, the punitive damage part of 
3 the case is based on Hodges vs, Gibson cited in our brief, 1991 
4 Supreme Court decision where the Supreme Court adopts the 
5 restatement of tort 2nd Section 909. Mr. Lambert has read the 
6 four theories upon which punitive damages can be assessed 
7 against a master whose servant has committed an act of tort. 
8 I think that in our brief we have suggested that as in 
9 the Johnson vs. Rogers case where the Court said that there's a 
10 jury question on whether or not the company authorized the 
11 doing in the manner of the act in that case, which was taking a 
12 company vehicle out while in a state of extreme intoxication. 
13 In our case, as suggested in their brief on page 21, they say 
14 that there's evidence that Coca-Cola had heard that Steingel 
15 had a part-time second job. They knew he had a second job, 
16 they didn't inquire about how that second job might impact on 
17 the performance on his job with Coca-Cola. 
18 Had they done so they would have found that this 
19 second job was a job where he worked all night and did 
20 inventory work and was therefore up all night and then went out 
21 on the job and drove his vehicle for Coca-Cola going from store 
22 to store. In this case— 
23 THE COURT: So what does that mean? 
24 MR. GOODWILL: That means that— 
25 THE COURT: That he's unfit? 
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1 MR. GOODWILL: Yes. I'm talking about not his 
2 unfitness at this point, I'm talking about the principal 
3 authorizing the agent doing something as a manner that he was 
4 doing it in. If they had an obligation to — our second cause 
5 of action in our complaint is negligent supervision. 
6 In supervising an employee you ought to know what he's 
7 doing, and you know enough to know that he's not just working 
8 your job, he's working another job. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, so he's working two jobs. 
10 MR. GOODWILL: And you ought to inquire about the 
11 impact of that second job on the first job. Had they done so 
12 they would have found out that it in fact made him unfit for 
13 him employment on the first job because he was being up all 
14 night. He actually fell asleep in the accident in this case, 
15 he fell asleep, crossed over the center line and hit my client 
16 head on. I'm saying it's reckless disregard not to inquire 
17 further just to find out that he has a job, not to find out how 
18 it impacts on the first job with Coca-Cola, and reckless 
19 disregard for the circumstances is a basis for imposing 
20 punitive damages. 
21 In addition, after the accident, they heard about it 
22 within two to three hours — that was the deposition of the 
23 supervisor. They did nothing to correct his behavior, they did 
24 nothing to reprimand him so that this would not occur— 
25 THE COURT: Didn't they do investigation to find out 
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1 I it was an accident? 
2 MR. GOODWILL: They found out there was an accident. 
3 THE COURT: (Inaudible) investigation (inaudible) it 
4 was an accident, didn't they? 
5 MR. GOODWILL: I don't know what they did. All I know 
6 is that they did not — they said in their deposition they 
7 didn't reprimand him or take any affirmative action against 
8 him. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. GOODWILL: If the agent is unfit and the 
11 managerial agent was reckless in retaining or employing him 
12 under (b) of the restatement, then that's a basis for holding 
13 the employer liable for punitive damages. I'm saying he was 
14 unfit because he was working on a job that kept him up all 
15 night, causing him to fall asleep when he was on a job the 
16 following day, that the principal was reckless in retaining him 
17 by not investigating further. 
18 I believe that if you compare the Johnson vs. Rogers 
19 case with our case, true, there is no drinking, there is no 
20 drug involvement in our case— 
21 THE COURT: I'm having (inaudible). There's nothing 
22 like that here going down the road drinking, there's none of 
23 that here. 
24 MR. GOODWILL: No, but I submit that a driver in an 
25 extreme state of exhaustion is more dangerous than a driver— 
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exhaustion, 
Is that he fell 
evidence. 
Not evidence of extreme— 
GOODWILL: 
COURT: 
it. 
I 
And then he was working all 
guess if that's the 
night the 
way you want to 
MR. GOODWILL: I think the natural conclusion is that 
he fell asleep because he hadn't had any sleep the night 
before. I submit that a driver who is asleep is more dangerous 
than a driver who's under the influence of an intoxicant. At 
least the driver who is under the influence of an intoxicant 
has the use of some of his senses, though limited and impaired. 
A driver asleep has the use of none of his five senses. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lambert? 
MR. LAMBERT: And I would be brief, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why don't you address the issue that Mr. 
Dunn is harping on, and that is that the court of appeals and 
the Supreme Court are saying that Section 15-4-4 has been 
repealed, in essence, as a new statute 78-27-42. 
MR. LAMBERT: I will, your Honor. I'm going to cover 
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1 three points again first, and I think I can do it briefly. He 
2 cited, and I'm probably mispronouncing the name, but Krukowitz, 
3 or something of that. It's a 1986 Utah Supreme Court decision 
4 that involves the Comparative Negligence Act, and they ruled 
5 that an entirely different definition of defendant controlled 
6 in that case. 
7 The Nelson case is after the adoption of the Liability 
8 Reform Act, and is a 1997 decision. What the Court said, 
9 "Notwithstanding the reliance of the parties and the briefs on 
10 competing interpretations of the Liability Reform Act—" 
11 remember, the case that Mr. Dunn was citing had to do with — 
12 was more than 10 years earlier and was the Comparative 
13 Negligence Act. We've moved beyond that. "We conclude that 
14 this case may be resolved pursuant to the Joint Obligations 
15 Act," and then gives a citation. 
16 And then the very footnote that Mr. Dunn relies on, 
17 footnote 3, they say, "However, since the LRA, the Liability 
18 Reform Act, does not address vicariously liable parties, 
19 Section 15-4-4 now applies to those parties." So our Supreme 
20 Court has ruled in that very footnote that Mr. Dunn tried to 
21 rely on that vicariously — that the Liability Reform Act does 
22 not apply to vicariously liable parties* I don't know how the 
23 Supreme Court could have been clearer* 
24 Then he reads a court of appeals decision, Thornock, 
25 that's the other decision he relies on. Thornock is 
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1 distinguishable on two grounds. First of all, it does not deal 
2 with vicariously liable parties, as does Nelson. So it is 
3 inapplicable. 
4 Secondly, the Thornock decision, which is a court of 
5 appeals instead of a Supreme Court decision, does not 
6 address — even though the opinion is issued several months 
7 later, it does not address Nelson. 
8 Now we can speculate all we want, no doubt, because 
9 Nelson hadn't been decided it wasn't covered in the brief, but 
10 nowhere in the Thornock decision is Nelson discussed. It may 
11 be because it is distinguishable because it doesn't involve 
12 vicariously liable parties, or it may be they simply ignored 
13 it. But the Supreme Court decision controls over the court of 
14 appeals anyway. 
15 I invite the Court to re-read Nelson. It's crystal 
16 clear what it holds, and it held in that case that 15-4-4 
17 applied in a vicariously liable situation, and 15-4-4 says that 
18 where an obligee releases — it shall not discharge a co-
19 obligor, that is the employer in this case, against with whom 
20 the obligee in writing is part of the same transaction as the 
21 release or discharge expressly reserves his rights. 
22 In Nelson they did, in this case they do not. They do 
23 expressly reserve their rights against American States, and 
24 they proceed against them, but they did not against the 
25 employer. 
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1 Then Mr. Dunn's final argument was, "Well, it's 
2 limited by the language of 15-4-5.w The first paragraph 
3 applies to parties who know or who have reason to know. Well, 
4 he says that Mr. Peterson didn't know or have reason to know, 
5 so that section doesn't apply. Although, if they did have 
6 reason to know — in other words, just ask Mr. Steingel — that 
7 section says you pay — have reason to (inaudible) release or 
8 discharge obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. Well, 
9 an employee of vicarious (inaudible) he's obligated to pay the 
10 full amount anyway because of the rights to indemnity. But 
11 they say that section doesn't apply. 
12 The second section is if they don't know or have 
13 reason to know, you pay the lesser of two amounts, A) the 
14 amount of the fractual share of the obligor release. Well, 
15 that isn't the amount paid, that's the amount that — I think 
16 it's more reasonable, the amount they are ultimately are 
17 reliable for, but I think, frankly, it only applies here, 
18 partnerships or where there's agreement. 
19 It doesn't matter because B) resolves it, it's the 
20 lesser amount. The amount that such obligor was bound by its 
21 contract, Mr. Dunn talked about the contract, but that's not 
22 what we're talking about. Bound by contract or relation, 
23 you're bound by your relation with the co-obligor to pay. 
24 Well, when an employee is bound by his relationship to 
25 an employer, the employer has indemnity rights. The Nelson 
-47-
1 decision, the Joint Obligation Act, I think, are clear. Do you 
2 have any further questions on that issue? 
3 THE COURT: Well, what about this Krukowitz case? 
4 MR. LAMBERT: All right, the Krukowitz— 
5 THE COURT: He says on — I can't tell you what page 
6 it's on, but just before the — probably last page talks about 
7 (inaudible) before these other authorities (inaudible). Do you 
8 know where that is? 
9 MR. LAMBERT: Not without looking at the decision, 
10 but—-
11 THE COURT: It says the term "joint tortfeasors" 
12 (inaudible) vicariously liable for (inaudible) and the 
13 indemnity provisions of (inaudible) preserves any right of 
14 indemnity (inaudible) law. It says Draper, the employer in 
15 this case, was not released by the (inaudible) court of appeals 
16 case o r — 
17 MR. LAMBERT: Well, Nelson deals with that issue 
18 directly. Remember Krukowitz is an 1986 case under the 
19 Comparative Negligence Act, the definition of joint defendant 
20 or joint is different. When we adopted — when this state 
21 adopted the Liability Reform Act they changed that definition 
22 to refer to fault, and then this Court dealt with that issue 
23 when Mr. Dunn read it in the Nelson case on page 514 in 
24 footnote 3. They discuss Krukowitz. MWe recognize that 
25 Section 78-27-42 of the CNA was a pro tanto repeal of Section 
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1 | 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations Act. To the extent that the 
2 I Liability Reform Act still addresses regular co-defendants- — 
3 regular co-defendants, those are (inaudible) who are liable 
4 because of fault, "the LRA will supersede or add as a pro tanto 
5 repeal of Section 15-4-4 as to those defendants." 
6 The next sentence, "However, since the LRA does not 
7 address vicariously liable parties, Section 15-4-4 now applies 
8 to those parties." The Nelson takes care of that. 
9 THE COURT: That settles that question. 
10 MR. LAMBERT: The second issue I wanted to briefly 
11 reply to is the argument by Mr. Dunn that somehow we hid in the 
12 bush or we're trying to take advantage of payments made by 
13 other people. Of course, there's no evidence because there 
14 can't be, (inaudible) that we participated in these release, we 
15 made false representation or anything else. That's simply not 
16 true. 
17 What this case, what this argument really is about, 
18 Mr. Dunn is giving you a release and trust agreement, a copy of 
19 the release and trust agreement wherein he entered into a — 
20 not he, but American States, who is the interest of whom he 
21 represented, entered into an agreement whereby they wished to 
22 exercise subrogation rights to recover their $300,000. This is 
23 really about a debate, really, about American States trying to 
24 get their $300,000 back. 
25 I think if you will look at that release and trust 
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1 agreement that he gave you, you will find — I think it's a 
2 1994 agreement, and you will find that it is signed by Mr. 
3 Peterson. So even Mr. Dunn here is relying in support of his 
4 argument on a document that he claims to be enforceable. Why? 
5 Because Mr. Peterson signed it — not Mrs. Peterson, but Mr. 
6 Peterson signed it, and I think that should put an end 
7 completely and totally to this argument that the release is 
8 unenforceable. They had him entered into a subsequent 
9 document. 
10 Now with respect to the — obviously we think the 
11 Nelson case releases us and that solves the problem. With 
12 respect to Mr. Dunn's argument about the credit of the 
13 $300,000, Nelson case makes it clear that you get credit for 
14 money that's paid in behalf of the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor 
15 in this case is Mr. Steingel, who fell asleep when driving, and 
16 under a third motorist coverage, pays for the liability of the 
17 underinsured motorist. They didn't pay for the liability of my 
18 client, who isn't underinsured, they paid for the underinsured 
19 motorist, it's based strictly on his liability. 
20 We quoted that policy language in our original memo 
21 when we made the original argument that we were entitled to the 
22 $350,000. Then what underinsured motorist carriers do is try 
23 to recoup the money from the underinsured motorist, but in this 
24 case, of course, Mr. Peterson has released that underinsured 
25 motorist carrier, and they have no right. 
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1 I think for a number of reasons that American States 
2 is not entitled to recoup their $300,000, and that is not in 
3 the interest of Mr. Peterson. But based on our initial 
4 argument, it's clear we get credit under Nelson if the release 
5 doesn't release us for a vicarious liability, and based on 
6 these arguments, that seems crystal clear. 
7 Just one final comment, and that has to do with 
8 punitive damages. You can't allow punitive damages to go to a 
9 jury based on a negligence allegation or argument that we 
10 negligently supervised. It has to be reckless. Even Johnson 
11 made that clear. And their only argument where they didn't 
12 inquire as to the effect of Mr. Peterson's working all night. 
13 Now assuming there's true, because there's no evidence before 
14 the Court, that is evidence of negligence. It's clearly not a 
15 punitive damage issue. 
16 I do think it's very important to point out to the 
17 Court that there is not any evidence that this part-time job 
18 required Mr. Peterson to work all night every night. He chose 
19 to do so on this particular night, and there is no information 
20 and no evidence in this case that Swire was aware of that fact 
21 or aware of his state of alleged — being very tired on the day 
22 of the accident. There just simply is no evidence. 
23 Then he finally says, "You didn't punish him.M Well, 
24 we did go to the safety committee, who found that it was a 
25 preventable accident, and suggested ways that it could be 
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1 prevented. That may not be punishment, but it's hardly 
2 approval or applause of the activity. There is no basis for 
3 punitive damages. Again, my client is released from vicarious 
4 liability in this case. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lambert. In this matter, I 
6 believe that the position taken by defendant as to punitive 
7 damages is correct (inaudible). I also believe that the 
8 defendant is correct if he's liable at all and is entitled to 
9 an offset of $350,000. That leaves us with the critical issue 
10 of whether or not he should be liable or was released by the 
11 document signed by the plaintiff, his wife and his attorney. 
12 As far as the incompetency issue, I don't think 
13 there's any evidence to establish he was incompetent when he 
14 signed. It's four and a half years later, having a guardian or 
15 a conservator appointed for him doesn't establish he was 
16 entitled to sign the document on the date that he signed it. 
17 I believe that the Nelson case is dispositive in this 
18 matter, and that in order to maintain an action against a 
19 vicarious liable employer a party must be so reserved and 
20 released (inaudible) reserve against Coca-Cola, the motion will 
21 be granted. 
22 Will you submit a proper order? 
23 MR. LAMBERT: I will, and I'll submit it to counsel as 
24 for approval as to form. 
25 (Hearing concluded) 
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